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Abstract
Incident response is an area within cyber defense
that is responsible for detecting, mitigating, and
preventing threats within a given network. Like other
areas of cyber security, incident response is
experiencing a shortage of qualified workers which
has led to technological development aimed at
alleviating labor-related pressures on organizations.
A cognitive task analysis was conducted with incident
response experts to capture expertise requirements
and used an existing construct to help prioritize
development of new technology. Findings indicated
that current software development incorporates
factors such as analyst efficiency and consistency.
Gaps were identified regarding communication and
team navigation that are inherent to dynamic team
environments. This research identified which expertise
areas are needed at lower-tier levels of incident
response and which of those areas current automation
platforms are addressing. These gaps help focus future
studies by bridging expertise research to development
efforts.

1. Introduction
Incident response (IR) is an area within cyber
defense that focuses on detecting, mitigating, and
preventing threats for a given network. IR is often
considered the first line of defense that includes
human analysts working closely with technology to
process network data. One issue within this area is
hiring and maintaining adequate numbers of human
analysts who are qualified to work in these roles.
In order to alleviate the pressure on organizations
to continuously hire and train these individuals,
technological approaches are being pursued to reduce
overall workload on analysts [1-4]. Expertise
requirements for incident responders have been
collected and published [5], but may not accurately
depict the full scope of expertise needs due to the
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variety of tasks required in the analyst role, including
communication and collaboration.
Technological development is rapid in response to
the urgency from industry to mitigate burnout and
increase coverage of incident responders. However, it
is unclear if current technology adequately addresses
needs of analysts, especially given the depth and
breadth of knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs)
needed to do the job effectively. Adoption rates of
automation and orchestration platforms remain low
compared to other incident response technologies [6]
likely due to time and cost investments for
deployment. Though business literature hails these
platforms as the ultimate solution for struggling firms,
little evidence is available that suggests that they have
made an impact in operational and organizational
performance.
This paper presents a holistic approach to
qualifying expertise needs in IR teams, particularly at
the lower tiers of analysts. The study presented in this
paper includes novel work based on the author’s own
research. The author conducted cognitive task analysis
interviews to collect expertise data that could be
analyzed and compared to recent automation-focused
technology. The goal was to identify gaps and
opportunities in development. The study was part of a
larger methodology in the author’s dissertation that
explored information sharing in IR processes.

2. Background
Security IR teams are comprised of analysts who
are often structured into tiers. Tiers represent different
levels of investigation and response, and typically
correlate with breadth of expertise across incident
types and depth of expertise within specific skill areas.
Incidents typically start at the lowest tier where a
novice analyst will conduct triage investigation,
collecting information and compiling it into a ticket. If
resolution of an incident is outside the scope of an
analyst’s role or expertise, the incident is escalated to
the next tier. This cycle repeats, adding richness and
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depth to the investigation as the analyst tier increases,
until the incident is resolved.

2.1. Expertise in cyber incident response
Incident response in cyber security requires
applying a wide range KSAs in a decision-making and
problem-solving capacity, often under temporal
pressure [7]. Classification of KSAs to work roles
represents the bulk of building foundational
understanding of expertise in this domain. It is also
important to understand how expertise is distributed
and shared in dynamic work settings across multiple
analysts. Previous studies have worked on mapping
expertise to tasks or job requirements. Within cyber
security specifically, Chen et al. [8] performed
different task analyses and linkage analysis to
understand expertise gaps in IR. The National
Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE)
framework also details a comprehensive inventory of
knowledge required for different positions in cyber
security [5]. Another study produced knowledge maps
from surveys to understand how well-equipped
incident responders were to perform daily tasks [9].
These examples illustrate how correlating functions
with expertise can provide an understanding of
knowledge gaps in groups.
Trends across business literature show that one
response to a shortage of qualified workers has been
developing technology that can augment expertise or
eliminate human-in-the-loop tasks with the goal of
reducing investigation times and improving
consistency [1, 10, 11]. However, there is not strong
evidence that work conducted to understand expertise
in IR has impacted the development of this new
technology.
One potentially useful construct within expertise
literature uses a dimensional approach to capture other
aspects of expertise beyond the traditional definition
of subject matter expertise [12]. The “six dimensions
of expertise” construct offers a theoretical foundation
for categorizing additional expertise elements (i.e.
communication, interface/tool, etc.), but lacks a path
to put into practice, particularly for collecting,
analyzing, and synthesizing data toward a
development goal. The discussion section of this paper
presents opportunities for improving the construct and
suggests some areas to focus development efforts and
help augment targeted expertise in IR.

2.2. Technological trends: helping the analyst
In order to identify new directions in technological
development for IR, it is necessary to identify the

current state of the market and how technology is
addressing analyst needs at present. The current
market for IR software is flooded with potential
options that vary in scope, depth, sophistication, and
cost. Within this pool, a specific subset of developers
has focused on providing platforms with capabilities
to automate (perform autonomously) and orchestrate
(guide coordinated activities) processes in security
organizations.
Security Orchestration, Automation and Response
(SOAR) technologies are software platforms that are
designed, built, and marketed to increase capacity and
efficiency in IR organizations. They focus on
integrating existing software within an organization
and developing new capabilities to reduce an analyst’s
time on an incident. IR analysts must monitor, use, and
pivot between a variety of programs and appliances.
SOAR technology aims to reduce pivoting by
integrating signals from different tools into a single
interface. Moreover, the industry has recognized the
shortage of analysts, which has resulted in an aim to
reduce hands-on time of analysts on menial tasks by
automating low-level activities and allowing more
time for applying expertise in more difficult tasks.
There are at least a dozen different platforms
currently available on the market, though more
software companies are aiming to add SOAR
capabilities to their existing products and services to
compete. The expected growth of SOAR solutions in
practice is 15% by 2020 [6], up from 1% in 2018 [13].
This market validation indicates that more firms are
recognizing the potential benefits of integration,
automation, and orchestration in their security
organizations, as well as the need to address labor
shortages, data deluge, and disparate tools.
Gartner, Inc. conducted a detailed analysis of
SOAR capabilities [10] that identified requirements of
what platforms should be able to do to meet industry
needs. These include integration across security
software solutions, process and workflow guidance,
journaling support, case management, and reporting
capabilities, to name a few. Many of the
recommendations aim to address organizational needs
in computer security. Employing new approaches like
the one presented in this paper may also be useful in
developing system requirements from the users’
perspectives and may help address some underlying
causes of the issues felt in the field. This approach
evaluated the features developed towards Gartner’s
requirements against what IR experts believe is needed
to effectively work at the lower tiers of IR.

2.3. Research goals
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The goals of the study described in this paper were
to identify development gaps in building new
technology for cyber defenders based on data collected
by the author. First, the author aimed to show breadth
of expertise needed in lower tiers of IR by using a
dimensional construct to capture non-traditional
aspects of expertise from Cognitive Task Analysis
(CTA) data. The results act as guidance for what types
of training or technology might be useful for this level
of IR.
Second, the author compared expertise
requirements of incident responders to available
technological capabilities that could address those
expertise requirements. Specifically, automation and
orchestration platforms include features and
capabilities that claim to help analysts; the author
classified those features using the dimensional
expertise construct to identify where technology is
focusing development. Results summarize overlaps
and gaps in how the latest technologies are addressing
expertise requirements of cyber defenders in incident
response.

3. Methods
This study included two main methods for data
collection and analysis. The author conducted CTA
interviews with subject matter experts in IR to identify
expertise that helps incident responders perform their
daily tasks. A market analysis was conducted to
catalog technology being developed to automate IR
tasks. Both sets of data were coded and categorized
within the dimensional expertise construct, then
compared to capture general gaps in alignment
between analyst needs and technological solutions.

3.1. Knowledge elicitation from experts
CTA is a subset of methods used to assess the
knowledge and cognitive activities needed to perform
a particular set of tasks based on subject matter expert
experience [14]. Literature indicates that CTA is the
best suited for expertise-aimed studies interested in
understanding what knowledge is required and how it
relates to the overall task structure [14]. CTA is
especially appropriate for developing technological
solutions to support cognitive processes, and has been
performed in cyber security to understand and improve
team effectiveness [8], situation awareness [15] and
system design [16]. This study used the Applied
Cognitive Task Analysis methodology (ACTA) [17]
to explore expertise needs in IR teams. ACTA
provided a well-structured protocol split into a task
analysis, a knowledge audit, and a simulation

interview. ACTA also includes interview prompts for
novice researchers and produces an organized set of
findings for comparison and additional analysis.
The study included five participants (N = 5) with
five or more years of experience in IR. While small in
sample size qualitative research, including CTA
methods, often has a lower number of participants, but
produces rich data with high cost-benefit ratio [14, 1821]. Determination of sample size occurred
dynamically based on data saturation after each
participant was interviewed. Participants had diverse
backgrounds across different sectors (academia,
government, industry). The author also notes that this
population was extraordinarily difficult to study,
especially given security concerns around interacting
with individuals outside their respective organizations.
Each interview followed the ACTA format [17]
and lasted approximately 90-120 minutes. As CTA
methods are most effective with a specific task on
which to focus, the author had previously determined
information sharing functions (i.e. escalations) as a
critical but understudied step in the larger IR process
[22]. These functions acted as the main task for
investigation using ACTA.
The main output of the ACTA method was a table
that compiles the full range of interview responses
from participants into a digestible and usable format
for informing design; this table is called a cognitive
demands table (CDT). Each transcript was used to
populate the details of a CDT per participant.

3.2. Dimensions of expertise in IR
The “six dimensions of expertise” construct [12]
includes subject matter, communication, information
flow path, expert identification, interface/tool, and
situational context as unique categories of expertise.
This construct was not developed beyond definition of
and justification for each dimension at the time of this
study. However, it is a generalizable construct across
different knowledge-based tasks. Additionally, the
construct offered a common ground on which domains
or needs can be compared.
The author aimed to apply and further define this
construct in the context of security IR. Accordingly,
two additional “dimensions” (policy and selfawareness) were added based on existing IR literature
[23-26] and a preceding ethnographic study conducted
by the author that investigated incident response
organizations [22]. The additions incorporated
elements of lower-tier analyst work that require an
individual to evaluate organization-based rules and
own performance in order to determine next steps in
an investigation. A summary of the dimensions of
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3.2.1. Interview data analysis. Analysis of interview
data employed a top-down qualitative coding scheme
based on the dimensions of expertise described in
Table 1. In order to increase the trustworthiness of
research findings, analysis included two raters
(including the author) with a background in qualitative
research methods. After a 45-minute training exercise
with the codebook, raters independently coded the
participant CDTs.
The CDTs were organized in a table format; within
each cell, text was broken down into smaller segments.
Each segment was a statement copied or summarized
from the interviews and acted as a unit for coding. The
raters labeled these units using the codebook as a
guideline. Units could be coded with more than one
category (that is, segments could have any number of
codes that applied). Each rater labeled segments using
the designation in the codebook (C1-C6) for the
original six dimensions of expertise and the two
additional codes previously described (C7-C8). When
complete, coding results were compiled into a
spreadsheet format.
Table 1. Definitions of dimensions of expertise in IR
Dimension of
Expertise
Subject matter

Communicatio
n

Code

Definition

C1

Expertise in a given subject matter
area; Usually related to a specific
area but can also be general;
Pertaining to domain knowledge
The style used to communicate
with someone; tactics for how
analysts are approached;
vocabulary used to communicate
something; using different styles
for different people; being
receptive of communication
Concerning the method used to
contact someone; Knowing which
path is the most appropriate for a
given person
Knowing who to go to when you
need additional knowledge or
expertise in a given area; Knowing
who to send something to, or who
should address a given issue
User skill in manipulating
technological systems; Familiarity
with tools and navigating interfaces
Knowing the environmental and
situational context and how each
affects the outcome of an incident
Institutionalized knowledge
regarding security posture; Driven
by rules or procedure developed at
upper management / company
official level

C2

Information
flow path

C3

Expert
identification

C4

Interface/tool

C5

Situational
context

C6

Policy

C7

Self-awareness

C8

Driven by understanding of self,
including limitations and selfevaluation; meta-cognition

3.2.2. Inter-rater reliability (IRR). In qualitative
research, one way to define reliability is the extent to
which a set of scores is random [27], or how much of
the variance is due to variability in participants being
scored. In addition to understanding dimensions of
expertise in IR, the author evaluated the original
expertise construct in practice to identify how it could
be strengthened as a tool. To establish trustworthiness
in applying the six dimensions of expertise construct,
the author included a second rater (in addition to
herself) for data analysis and assessed IRR between
both raters for the original six dimensions only. The
author used Cohen’s κ [28], which is a reliability
coefficient designed for fully crossed design with
exactly two raters. Cohen’s κ includes probability of
agreement by chance in addition to rates of agreement.
To compute κ, a contingency table was calculated
to compare ratings by code and by rater (Table 2). As
shown, the contingency table is a 6 x 6 table in which
full agreements between raters were tallied in the
diagonal and disagreements were tallied by rater and
by code. The κ coefficient for this dataset between two
raters was κ = 0.51, or “fair agreement” [29], but
suggests that additional work is needed to understand
potential overlap in certain dimensions, particularly
subject matter (C1) and situational context (C6). This
IRR outcome is further discussed in Section 4.1.
Table 2. Evaluating the original construct: Contingency
table of agreement between raters

Rater 2

expertise applied in this research are described in
Table 1; the ‘codes’ were used for qualitative analysis.

C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6

C1
61
0
3
4
6
2

C2
1
49
3
7
0
3

Rater 1
C3
1
1
20
1
0
0

C4
8
0
2
60
3
5

C5
5
0
0
2
30
0

C6
26
3
5
4
7
56

3.3. Technology market analysis
The author used the dimensions of expertise to
categorize technological capabilities advertised in the
market in 2019. Analysis included SOAR platforms to
capture the latest commercially available automation
capabilities, which mainly market to security
operations organizations and include tiered incident
response teams.
SOAR platforms included in this study were
selected using a combination of two different
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4. Results

and include partial and full agreement between raters.
Due to the nature and scope of interview, the author
cannot definitively conclude that frequency indicates
“ground truth” importance of dimensions of expertise
within IR. However, the frequency may suggest
perception of importance amongst experts who have
deep experience in the field.
Figure 1 shows sums of tallies for both raters
across the eight (8) codes used in data analysis. Subject
matter expertise (169 tallies) and situational context
expertise (161 tallies) were the top two dimensions,
followed by expert identification expertise (126
tallies) and communication expertise (91 tallies).
Interface or tool expertise (75 tallies), self-awareness
(74 tallies), policy (65 tallies), and information flow
path (59 tallies) were relatively close in frequency.
Subject matter and situational context expertise
were the top two dimensions of expertise indicated by
experts as necessary for successfully conducting lower
tier incident response activities, especially regarding
information sharing tasks. The co-occurrence of these
two dimensions indicates that knowing what signals
mean is but one aspect of IR; knowing the context in
which that signal occurs is also important to help
determine if the signal can be ignored or if it requires
action. This is a critical decision point for lower tier
analysts who must often act as a filter for determining
if something is an incident that requires investigation.
The IRR matrix (Table 2) also suggests that further
definition and development may be needed in the
construct itself to achieve higher IRR. These two
dimensions may have significant overlap or even
dependency, which could be explored in future
studies.
Expert Interview Tallies by Dimension of
Expertise
Tallies across IR experts

techniques. First, the author used a well-cited report on
SOAR technologies [10] to identify some of the
platforms to be included in the analysis. The report
highlighted 16 different SOAR vendors including in
the in-depth analysis of SOAR capabilities. Second, a
generic Internet search was conducted for “SOAR,
technology, cyber security” to identify other
prominent tools that might not have existed at the time
or were not included in the report. From these two
techniques, nine (9) platforms were chosen for
analysis based on feature data availability as not all
platform websites offered insights into their features
and capabilities. The platforms for this study included
Cybersponse, Demisto, Siemplify, Swimlane,
Phantom, D3 Soar, LogRhythm, Syncurity, and
Resilient.
In order to gain information about each platform,
each associated website was evaluated as the main
source of data and included technical reports, white
papers, and sales information. Collection included a
line-by-line capability assessment of each platform;
each capability or feature described was recorded.
Each feature was then evaluated against the
dimensions of expertise to identify which
dimension(s) the feature could potentially augment for
a human user. For example, if a platform advertised a
capability of “codeless playbook creation”, the author
tallied the relevant dimensions of expertise as subject
matter and interface/tool expertise, as the feature
alleviates need to express functions in a specific
computer language and overcomes the need to interact
with a specialized tool. The author notes that
interpretation of the capability may be dependent upon
the rater’s familiarity with domain-specific tools and
terms; this was a key limitation of the approach and
the main reason for the use of a single rater for this
activity.
Tallied information was recorded in a large matrixstyle table. Sums of tallies for each dimension were
calculated across all SOAR platforms to understand
total platform capabilities compared to data from
experts regarding dimensions of expertise needed in
IR.
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4.1. Lower tier IR expertise requirements
Expertise requirements were elicited from CTA
with IR experts about information sharing tasks at
lower tier response. Sums of tallies for each code,
including policy and self-awareness, are depicted in
Figure 1. These counts are indicators of frequency in
the expert interviews as interpreted by the two raters

Figure 1. Tallies of interview data for dimensions of
expertise across two independent raters

Expert identification and communication expertise
were commonly identified by experts as necessary for
successfully conducting information sharing tasks,
such as handoffs and escalations. These two
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4.2. Expertise augmentation by technology
Technological focus of automation and expertise
augmentation was elicited through a market analysis
of SOAR platforms. Figure 2 shows summarized data
from this analysis, depicting sums of tallies for each
code. These sums are indicators of frequency in SOAR
marketing materials as interpreted by the author. The
order of presentation used for Figure 1 was also used
in Figure 2 to show ordered alignment of the categorial
data between expert interviews and SOAR features.
Among the dimensions of expertise listed in Table
1, the most apparent dimension in SOAR features was
situational context expertise. IR analysts need to pivot
continuously between screens and platforms in order
to gain context about an incident. Thus, developing
technology to address these inefficiencies may take
higher priority. According to the data, many SOAR
platforms focus on bringing the context to the analyst
by fetching data from different appliances and
displaying them to the user, effectively reducing the
need for the analyst to manually retrieve and assemble
all relevant information to make a decision.
The next dimension of expertise most apparent in
SOAR features was policy. Decisions in IR often rely
on knowledge of how an analyst’s firm wants to
handle particular incidents. That is, not all companies
want to respond to every incident in a uniform way,
and incident responders at the lowest tier of the
organization must know how to act based on that
posture. However, experts indicated that interpreting
policy can be difficult or even inappropriate for lower
tier responders because of inherently low policy
expertise. Accordingly, SOAR platforms may try to
augment this dimension by having preprogrammed

guidance to provide to the analyst when making
decisions about different incidents.
Expert identification was the next most represented
dimension of expertise in SOAR features. Analysts are
often organized into tiers, which correlate with
expertise. Incidents enter the workflow at the lowest
level in which analysts begin collecting and compiling
relevant information from a suite of tools to support
investigation and outcomes. However, not all
incidents can be completely resolved at the lowest tier.
An analyst might reach a point when they cannot go
further, at which point they escalate the incident,
pushing the compiled information as well as
responsibility for resolution to the next level of
responders.
SOAR Feature Tallies by Dimension of
Expertise
Tallies across SOAR platforms

dimensions support knowing to whom an incident
should be sent for additional response activities, which
is often dependent on the recipient’s skills and
knowledge areas. Accordingly, communication helps
effectively transfer pertinent information related to
that incident with appropriate level of detail and
urgency, which can impact the recipient’s available
time to respond and prioritization of actions.
Prior research has identified a strong teaming
component in IR [7-9, 30, 31] despite the tiered
structure seen in many organizations. Several
dimensions of expertise support team activities,
including communication, expert identification, and
self-awareness, all of which are represented in results
from the CTA. These results suggest that the software
and environment of IR analysts should support these
activities, especially for lower tier analysts who may
not have developed deep expertise in any given
dimension.
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Figure 2. Tallies for dimensions of expertise across
orchestration and automation features

One key finding from previous studies [7, 9, 32]
and from expert interviews in this paper was that
knowing who to send the ticket to, or who to ask for
help, was a key piece of navigation within an IR team.
Yet, it is not always obvious or reinforced within a
given team. SOAR platforms, which are highly
customized per organization, claim to provide
guidance in support of this dimension of expertise.
Augmenting expert identification expertise includes
helping analysts determine where information or
knowledge might exist, whether it is a person or some
other non-human source. Some platforms, in bringing
the context to the user, automate this dimension of
expertise altogether. Others claim to provide
recommendations about who might be able to help
with a particular ticket. One trend observed from this
dataset was the feature of playbooks or runbooks [4,
10, 11], which create predefined paths for incidents
based on different indicators and may include to whom
the incident should be escalated.
Another dimension of expertise that was wellrepresented by both experts and by evidence in SOAR
features was interface and tool expertise. As
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mentioned, IR analysts must often navigate a suite of
tools and even perform sufficiently in multiple
scripting languages [33-35]. Each additional tool
presents another interface and set of rules that must be
mastered to perform the job effectively. SOAR
platforms aim to overcome the learning curve of
individual tools to allow the analyst to work
seamlessly between them with the goal of reducing
overall time to respond. This effort is both practical
and needed, especially considering the complexity of
the environment and software.
Finally, subject matter expertise was represented in
materials about SOAR technologies. In fact, SOAR
platforms advertised that this dimension of expertise
could be embedded into the rules of SOAR protocols
[1, 11], essentially modeling decisions from experts.
Expertise can come from the SOAR developer itself or
from the purchasing firm, effectively using their own
expertise to shape the protocols in their customized
SOAR platform. This trend of pulling expertise from
experts and embedding it into a system is not unlike
the development of ‘expert systems’ [36]. Some of the
lessons learned from the evolution of expert systems
in other fields may be useful in helping guide SOAR
development.
Information flow path expertise was not strongly
represented in expert interviews. However, data from
SOAR platforms provide evidence that new
technologies are augmenting this expertise anyways
through playbooks. These playbooks claim to
automate information dissemination in the background
while providing explicit guidance to the analyst
regarding escalating decisions.

5. Discussion
5.1. Dimensional expertise in lower tier IR
The six dimensions of expertise proved to be a
useful construct for expanding discussion around
understanding and transfer of expertise in cyber
security, especially as it related to non-traditional
‘dimensions’ that capture dynamic and collaborative
tasks like IR. Applying and expanding the construct
allowed the author to qualitatively evaluate expertise
representation within cyber security incident response.
The CTA results provide a basic level of
understanding of the breadth of expertise needed in
this domain beyond widely accepted and expanding
subject matter expertise requirements.
Further development of the theoretical construct
presents an opportunity for future research to further
validate findings and provide a basis for quantitative
measurement of expertise. This would especially be

useful if future work compared and integrated other
existing knowledge and expertise theories with
emphasis on content and construct validity. Integrating
existing measurement instruments or developing new
instruments that account for correlation or
dependencies, such as the co-occurrence of subject
matter and situational context expertise, would also be
valuable.
The results of this study indicate that the construct
was useful as a categorization tool for qualitative
comparison. However, even this limited application
was not without limitations. The sums of instances per
dimension as mentioned by an expert or targeted by a
developer is not a robust measure of frequency. The
sample sizes for both sets of data are small for a full
quantitative comparison, and the SOAR data were
rated by only the author due to domain specific
knowledge barriers. Content analysis of more
platforms and raw interview data is recommended to
provide a more representative quantitative outcome.
This study was able to identify a gap between what
IR experts believe is a needed dimension of expertise
for lower tier responders and what features automation
platforms are targeting for development. The gap is
evident in the misalignment between expert and
technological emphasis around communication
expertise and self-awareness, which will be further
discussed in the next section.
Considering the current labor shortage in IR, the
findings of this study indicate that there are potential
avenues for augmenting certain dimensions of
expertise to reduce the burden on lower tier analysts.
However, the findings also highlight that some
dimensions, such as communication expertise, selfawareness, and expert identification, might also be
addressed through other methods, such as training and
team development. Research to further explore this
angle could better inform training, development, and
retention strategies for incident responders [37].

5.2. Implications for technology development
Using knowledge elicitation methods to identify
needs in design is not a new concept. CTA methods
are often used to help determine requirements for new
systems [14]. This paper explored how to expand the
application of CTA by comparing outputs (from
experts) to what the market currently offers in IR
systems. This section discusses trends observed in
SOAR platforms as well as opportunities for
development to address analyst needs.
One common trend catalogued from SOAR
features was integration of technologies and showing
analysts a unified presentation of data sources and
potential paths forward; these were tallied as
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‘situational context expertise’ as they support
knowledge pertaining to context and respective
potential courses of action. The goal of many features
relating to this dimension was to achieve higher
analyst efficiency by effectively reducing the time
(and interface/tool expertise) needed to retrieve
relevant data in support of an investigation. However,
evaluation of analyst efficiency with and without these
platforms was not feasible due to the low adoption rate
of the technology. Furthermore, there was little
information available in the marketing and sales
information indicating that human-centered methods
were used to develop and support development efforts.
Situation awareness (SA) literature specifically
discusses how systems can support multiple levels of
SA in relation to expertise, which can act as guidelines
for system development and design [38]. Additional
cyber SA literature and ongoing research [39-42] also
may help guide application design specifically for
cyber security.
A dimension of expertise that was identified as
important for lower tier analysts was communication
expertise, also identified as interactional expertise
within expertise literature [43, 44]. Many SOAR
platforms advertised that they could help overcome
communication barriers by providing chat features
within the tool, as well as the ability to share other
artifacts and documents. This aims to not only
facilitate collaboration, but also to document the
process for an auditable record. However, the
definition of communication expertise extends beyond
the mode of communication (expressed as information
flow path in the original construct) and auditability of
analyst interactions. Instead, the CTA results
suggested that everyday communication skills (i.e.
knowing how to talk to people and interact with them
in different situations) are critical to analyst success at
lower tier tasks in IR. Results provided little evidence
of true augmentation of communication expertise in
SOAR platforms; this is one potential avenue for
technological exploration.
Results from the CTA showed that self-awareness
was a concept identified by experts as important but
was relatively unaddressed by SOAR platforms. Selfregulation and reflectiveness are both important
aspects of learning [45, 46]. Thus, self-awareness in
this context may be an important underlying aspect of
building expertise in general and progressing with
personal development. This is especially helpful in IR
tasks in which an individual must know his or her
boundaries, observe and evaluate their own
performance, and adjust as they learn. Within the
ACTA methodology, provided prompts identify
aspects of self-awareness in relation to expertise [4749]. The author also asserts that, while self-awareness

may be an individual trait, external feedback from the
analysts’ environments (including peers, systems, and
platforms) may contribute to increasing performance
indicators signals and trigger opportunities to selfreflect.
The goal of SOAR platforms is to reduce repetitive
tasks for humans through automation and increase
consistency by guiding response activities through
orchestration [1-4]. The desired effect of achieving
this goal is decreased labor shortages and some
additional level of protection to companies inundated
with data, false alarms, and a complicated array of
software. However, this strategy is based on
improving current operational stability. While the
added SOAR capability offers some level of solution
to immediate problems, the next steps of the field
should progress towards long-term development of
cyber security professionals [37, 50], recognizing that
the traditional path to becoming an expert in security
has fundamentally changed due to the introduction of
automation. Furthermore, system developers should
consider the role of menial (but fundamental) tasks in
analyst development, and the potential effects of
system failure coupled with incomplete system
understanding. These ‘ironies of automation’ [51] are
critical to identify and mitigate early in design cycles
to prevent potentially catastrophic outcomes. The
findings presented here indicate that there is no
explicit need for an entirely new platform, but
expanding design considerations to build expertise, in
addition to augmenting it, is warranted.

6. Conclusions
Cyber security incident response is one area within
the cyber defense domain currently struggling with
labor shortage issues at different levels of experience.
Technology development is currently focusing on
alleviating this pressure by automating low-level
repetitive tasks and providing additional guidance, or
augmenting expertise, in lower-tier response activities.
However, much of the development has focused on
eliminating inefficiencies; available materials about
automation in incident response does not support a
deep understanding of expertise-driven development.
Expertise has traditionally been associated with
deep knowledge within a particular subject matter
domain. However, expanding the scope of more
holistic expertise constructs can help identify
additional areas to focus research, education and
development efforts. This paper demonstrates how
such a construct can be applied within the cyber
incident response domain to capture gaps in how
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technology is addressing expertise shortages using
automation.
Future work in this area could focus on a variety of
areas, including an empirical study of how SOAR
platforms minimize expertise gaps while also
improving analyst effectiveness. Additional work is
also needed to connect findings from studies such as
this to existing frameworks, such as NICE, and to
educational curricula.
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